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Introduction
New Zealand was among the first countries in the world 
to implement a relatively comprehensive welfare state. But 
almost 80 years after the passage of the Social Security Act 
in 1938, serious social problems persist, not least significant 
levels of poverty – especially child poverty – and income 
inequality. In recent years, such problems have attracted 
growing public concern, as reflected in opinion polls and 
political debate.
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90; Rashbrooke, 2013). Likewise, poverty 
rates increased dramatically during these 
years, particularly when assessed after 
deducting housing costs from incomes. 
For children, the poverty rate in the mid-
1990s on one commonly used measure 
(i.e. 60% of median disposable household 
income, after adjusting for housing costs) 
was nearly three times higher than a 
decade earlier, and has remained close to 
double the rate of the mid-1980s ever since 
(Perry, 2017a, p.140). Such outcomes are 
troubling and rightly deserve public and 
political attention. Hopefully, they will 
generate thoughtful discussion during 
the 2017 election campaign.
This article briefly discusses the 
nature and measurement of poverty in 
developed countries, outlines the main 
trends in poverty rates in New Zealand 
over recent decades, comments on why 
poverty matters, and assesses recent 
government policy changes designed to 
alleviate poverty, especially child poverty. 
It also outlines what further measures 
will be required if New Zealand is to meet 
its commitments under the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
to halve poverty rates by 2030. In effect, 
this would entail returning poverty rates 
to the levels witnessed during the mid-
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Admittedly, income inequality (using the 
Gini coefficient and the Palma measure) 
does not appear to have increased since 
the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, it rose very 
substantially between the late 1980s 
and the mid-1990s (e.g. from a Gini of 
around 27 in the mid-1980s to around 
33 a decade later) (Perry, 2017a, pp.80-
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1980s and reducing material hardship 
rates to Scandinavian levels.
Measuring poverty
In brief, poverty means not having 
enough of those things which most people 
regard as essential; it implies insufficient 
resources to satisfy basic human needs or 
meet an acceptable minimum standard of 
living (Boston and Chapple, 2014, pp.22-
5; Perry, 2016, pp.91-7; Stephens, 2013). 
By contrast, inequality is about having 
more or less of something (e.g. income or 
wealth) than someone else. In developed 
countries like New Zealand there are two 
primary ways of measuring poverty: those 
based on income and those based on levels 
of material deprivation (or hardship). 
Both methods use various criteria to 
determine appropriate thresholds or 
benchmarks: those living in households 
with incomes or material deprivation 
rates below the relevant thresholds are 
deemed to be living in poverty. The two 
approaches capture different aspects of 
poverty and both have an important role 
to play in any measurement regime. 
The most commonly used income-
based poverty thresholds, at least in 
developed countries, are either 50% or 
60% of median disposable household 
incomes (i.e. after deducting income taxes 
and including transfers). Such poverty 
rates are thus a relative measure and will 
vary depending on the median income, the 
income threshold adopted, whether or not 
housing costs are taken into account (and, 
if so, how), and the nature of the 
equivalence scale adopted (i.e. how 
adjustments are made for the size and 
composition of households). Significantly, 
income-based poverty rates are sensitive to 
relatively small movements (up or down) 
in the generosity of social assistance, 
including benefit payments and tax credits. 
This is because such changes can shift large 
numbers of families above or below 
particular poverty thresholds. 
Income-based poverty measures make 
no allowance for the other resources to 
which people may have access (e.g. 
savings, intra-family transfers, charitable 
donations, etc.), whether they own 
property or a business, or their level of 
debt. Accordingly, it is helpful to 
supplement such measures with 
assessments of material deprivation (see 
Perry, 2015, 2017c). The latter measures 
attempt to capture the actual day-to-day 
living standards or circumstances of a 
family. They do this by assessing whether 
families lack important consumption 
items because they cannot afford them. 
The items selected are generally those 
which most people consider to be essential 
to meet basic needs or highly desirable if 
people are to participate fully in society. 
Surveys and/or focus groups are often 
used to decide which items should be 
included and to set specific thresholds of 
material deprivation. 
To some extent, deprivation rates 
reflect a country’s real per capita incomes: 
that is to say, they are higher in countries 
with lower living standards (i.e. as 
measured by GDP per capita) than those 
Table 1: Deprivation rates* in 13 countries comparing children with older people and the  
total population in 2007 (Europe) and 2008 (New Zealand)
Country Children 0-17 Aged 65+ total 
population
Netherlands 6 3 6
Norway 6 1 5
Sweden 7 3 6
Spain 9 11 11
Germany 13 7 13
Slovenia 13 18 14
Ireland 14 4 11
United Kingdom 15 5 10
New Zealand 18 3 13
Italy 18 14 14
Czech Republic 20 17 20
Hungary 42 35 38
Poland 39 41 44
* The deprivation rates in this table are based on the proportion of households who lack at least three items from a list of nine because 
they cannot afford them. All nine items are regarded as essential by the majority of the population.
Source: Perry, 2009, pp30-33
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Figure 1:  Proportion of all individuals in low-income households by age, based on 
a moving line (or annually adjusted relative) poverty threshold set at 60% 
of median disposable household incomes, after housing costs
Source: Perry (2017a, p.125)
Alleviating Poverty – issues and options
Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Issue 3 – August 2017 – Page 29
that are relatively wealthy. Hence, 
deprivation rates across all age groups 
are generally higher in Eastern European 
countries than in their richer 
counterparts in Western Europe (see 
Table 1). But variations in real per capita 
incomes are not the only reason 
deprivation rates differ. After all, some 
countries with broadly comparable living 
standards (e.g. Germany and Sweden) 
have different deprivation rates. Also, 
some countries with significant 
childhood deprivation rates (e.g. 12% or 
more, as in Britain and New Zealand) 
have much lower deprivation rates 
among the elderly. 
Not all countries, however, have such 
marked differences in poverty rates 
across different age groups. The fact that 
countries with comparable overall living 
standards have significantly different 
poverty rates (as well as different rates 
for different age groups) suggests that 
policy settings matter a good deal. In 
other words, to some extent governments 
can choose, via their tax and benefits 
systems, what the poverty rate will be for 
their citizens, including whether to 
favour specific population groups over 
others.
Poverty rates in New Zealand
Since the early 1980s poverty rates in 
New Zealand have changed markedly (see 
Boston and Chapple, 2014; Dale, O’Brien 
and St John, 2011; Perry, 2017a, 2017b, 
2017c). There have also been notable 
changes across age groups and household 
types. As highlighted in Figure 1, income-
based poverty rates (using a moving line 
or relative measure, after adjusting for 
housing costs) increased substantially for 
most age groups in the late 1980s and early 
to mid-1990s. As previously noted, on 
this measure the poverty rate for children 
(aged 0-17 years) almost tripled during 
these years, to close to 30% in 1994. It 
subsequently eased back to about 22% in 
2007, due in part to the reintroduction in 
the early 2000s of income-related rents 
for families living in state housing and 
the implementation of the Working for 
Families tax credits during 2005-07. It 
Table 2: The number of poor children in New Zealand based on selected poverty thresholds, 2001-16 (rolling averages since 2008)
Before housing costs (BHC) are deducted After housing costs (AHC) are deducted
BHC ‘anchored 
line (2007)’  
Before housing costs ‘moving 
line’ After housing costs ‘moving line’
After housing costs ‘anchored 
line (2007)’  
HES year 50% (07 ref) 50% 60% 40% 50% 60% 50% (07 ref) 60% (07 ref)
2001 225,000 120,000 250,000 115,000 215,000 310,000 285,000 380,000
2004 175,000 150,000 265,000 115,000 200,000 285,000 240,000 320,000
2007 135,000 135,000 210,000 115,000 175,000 240,000 175,000 240,000
2008 130,000 135,000 210,000 105,000 190,000 260,000 180,000 250,000
2009 115,000 130,000 225,000 140,000 210,000 285,000 195,000 265,000
2010 105,000 135,000 240,000 120,000 210,000 295,000 185,000 265,000
2011 120,000 145,000 245,000 125,000 210,000 305,000 190,000 270,000
2012 115,000 135,000 230,000 130,000 210,000 285,000 200,000 260,000
2013 105,000 125,000 220,000 135,000 205,000 275,000 185,000 245,000
2014 - 135,000 230,000 - 210,000 280,000 180,000 240,000
2015 90,000 145,000 235,000 130,000 215,000 300,000 170,000 240,000
2016 75,000 140,000 215,000 140,000 210,000 290,000 155,000 220,000
Source: Perry, 2017b, p.49
HES refers to the Household Economic Survey
There are approximately 1,060,000 children (0-17 years) in New Zealand; 40% of median AHC income poverty figures and 50% of BHC figures are not reported for HES 2014 because of data issues for 
some beneficiary incomes.
Table 3: Material hardship rates (%) and numbers of children: rolling two-year averages
Household 
Economic 
Survey year
MSD’s less severe hardship threshold, 
equivalent to the European Union’s 
‘standard’ threshold
MSD’s more severe hardship 
threshold, equivalent to the European 
Union’s ‘severe’ threshold
rate (%) number Rate (%) number
2008 16 170,000 8 80,000
2009 16 180,000 9 85,000
2010 18 190,000 9 95,000
2011 20 220,000 9 100,000
2012 19 200,000 9 95,000
2013 16 175,000 9 95,000
2014 15 155,000 8 90,000
2015 14 155,000 8 85,000
2016 12 135,000 6 70,000
Source: Perry, 2017b, p.48
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subsequently rose to almost 30% in 2010 
(following the global financial crisis) 
before declining modestly since then (to 
around 27%).
Table 2 shows that income-based 
poverty rates (in this case for children) 
differ significantly depending on: 
•	 the	specific	poverty	threshold	chosen	
(e.g. 50% or 60% of the median 
income); 
•	 whether	the	measure	employed	is	
anchored to a specific reference year 
(and thus held constant in real terms, 
but adjusted annually for price 
inflation) or is based on a moving line 
that alters when the median incomes 
change; and
•	 the	treatment	of	housing	costs	(i.e.	
whether or not housing costs are 
deducted). 
Poverty rates are typically lower before 
housing costs are deducted than after they 
are deducted. These differences reflect the 
relatively high cost of housing in New 
Zealand. Hence, enhancing housing 
affordability must be a crucial component 
of any long-term anti-poverty strategy. 
Depending on the income poverty 
threshold selected, there were between 
75,000 and 290,000 children living in 
income poverty during 2015-16 (Perry, 
2017b, p.49). Likewise, depending on the 
hardship threshold used, the number of 
children experiencing material hardship 
during the same period was between 
70,000 and 135,000 (see Table 3).
As previously noted, rates of child 
poverty compare unfavourably with those 
of other age groups, especially the elderly. 
This applies both with respect to income-
based measures (see Figure 1) and 
material deprivation measures (see Figure 
2). The higher rates of poverty among 
children reflect a failure by governments 
over several generations first, to design 
and implement sufficiently generous 
family assistance programmes, and 
second, to index such programmes to 
prices and/or wages. By contrast, there has 
been a multi-party commitment since 
1993 to set the rate of New Zealand 
superannuation at a level that minimises 
income poverty among the elderly, and 
adjust the rate in line with movements in 
both prices and average ordinary time 
weekly earnings. The living standards of 
superannuitants are thus protected in real 
and relative terms.
As highlighted in Figure 3, there have 
been marked differences since the early 
1990s in child poverty rates depending on 
whether parents are dependent on a 
welfare benefit or in paid employment. In 
the late 1980s only about 20% of children 
in ‘workless’ households were in poverty 
(using a fixed-line or constant value 
measure based on 60% of median 
disposable household income after 
deducting housing costs); by the early 
1990s the figure had almost quadrupled. 
Despite various social policy reforms in 
the early to mid-2000s, the poverty rate 
for children in ‘workless’ households was 
still around 60% in 2007. By contrast, the 
poverty rate for children in ‘working’ 
families (on the same measure) has barely 
exceeded 20% since the early 1980s, 
although the rate in the mid-1990s was 
certainly higher than during the previous 
decade. The discrepancy between the 
experience of ‘workless’ and ‘working’ 
Figure 3: Poverty rates for children in ‘workless’ and ‘working’ households, based on a 
poverty threshold set at 60% of median disposable household incomes, fixed 
line
Source: Perry, 2017, p.148
Note:  The discontinuity at 2007 arises because of the change of reference year from 1998 to 2007. 
The 2004-07 changes are shown using both reference years
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households reflects several major policy 
changes, notably the substantial cuts in 
the real value of welfare benefits in the 
early 1990s and the introduction of an in-
work tax credit in the mid-2000s.
Importantly, poverty rates among 
Mäori and Pasifika children are around 
double those among Päkehä/European 
children (Perry, 2017b, p.50). Similarly, 
Mäori and Pasifika children are almost 
twice as likely to be living in severe 
income poverty and face a higher risk of 
remaining in poverty for extended 
periods of time (Imlach Gunasekara and 
Carter, 2012). Likewise, rates of material 
hardship for Mäori and Pasifika children 
are several times the European rate. 
Child poverty in New Zealand is also 
concentrated spatially (e.g. in Northland, 
Gisborne, South Auckland, Porirua, 
eastern Christchurch and South 
Dunedin), and is higher among families 
with significant physical disabilities and/
or mental health issues. 
Why poverty matters
A substantial body of empirical evidence 
indicates that poverty, and especially 
child poverty, has harmful consequences 
(see Duncan, Ziol-Guest and Kalil, 2010; 
Duncan and Magnuson, 2013; Expert 
Advisory Group, 2012, pp.14-17; Gibb, 
Fergusson and Horwood, 2012; Ladd, 
2012). For example, compared with 
their better-off counterparts, children 
experiencing poverty in New Zealand:
•	 have	a	1.4	times	higher	risk	of	dying	
during their childhood;
•	 are	three	times	more	likely	to	suffer	ill	
health, 1.5 times more likely to be 
hospitalised, and twice as likely to be 
admitted to hospital for acute 
infectious diseases;
•	 are	much	more	likely	to	live	in	homes	
with no heating (because there are no 
heaters, there is no money to use 
heaters or no electricity due to unpaid 
bills);
•	 are	less	likely	to	participate	fully	in	
early childhood education and 
extracurricular activities; and
•	 are	less	likely	to	leave	school	with	
NCEA level 2, which is the entry-level 
qualification to skilled employment 
(see Expert Advisory Group, 2012, 
p.15).
Moreover, as Greg Duncan and his 
colleagues have highlighted based on US 
evidence, child poverty often has a long 
reach (Duncan, Ziol-Guest and Kalil, 
2010; Duncan and Magnuson, 2013). It 
can fundamentally affect a person’s whole 
life-course, contributing to protracted 
and repeated ill health, limited 
employment prospects, insecure housing 
and semi-permanent poverty.
Strategies for reducing poverty
Given the harmful effects of poverty, and 
especially poverty that is prolonged, severe 
or that occurs during early childhood, there 
are good reasons for seeking low poverty 
rates. Two questions then arise: what should 
be the policy goal in relation to poverty; and 
how can this goal best be achieved?
With respect to goals, New Zealand 
has endorsed the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals, which 
were agreed to in 2015 by virtually every 
country. The first of the 17 goals focuses 
on alleviating poverty and includes an 
explicit target for 2030, namely to ‘reduce 
at least by half the proportion of men, 
women and children of all ages living in 
poverty in all its dimensions according to 
national definitions’. In practical terms, 
this would imply New Zealand halving 
rates of both income-based poverty and 
material deprivation, and seeking to do so 
for all population groups. 
Such a goal, of course, is demanding. 
For one thing, reducing rates of material 
deprivation is inherently more difficult 
than cutting rates of income-based 
poverty. This is because deprivation rates 
depend on many factors over which 
governments have little control, including 
how families choose to allocate and utilise 
their financial and other resources. For 
another, as noted earlier, New Zealand 
already has low rates of income-based 
poverty and material deprivation among 
those aged 65 years and over, at least by 
international standards. Halving these 
rates would be challenging from a policy 
perspective. Against this, halving the 
current rates of child poverty (especially 
as measured on an income basis) is 
certainly feasible. After all, as previously 
discussed, 30 years ago New Zealand had 
child poverty rates around half their 
current rates. Also, there are currently 
countries in Europe (most notably in 
Scandinavia) with child poverty rates 
around half those in New Zealand. 
Likewise, it should be readily possible to 
achieve substantial reductions in rates of 
income-based poverty among Mäori and 
Pasifika.
The next question, therefore, is how to 
achieve goals, such as those embraced 
within the Social Development Goals, and 
to do so in a cost-effective and lasting 
manner. In broad terms, as Perry (2016, 
p.8) argues, there are three strategies 
available:
•	 increasing	household	income,	
whether through higher total earnings 
or increased government cash 
assistance or reduced taxation;
•	 reducing	the	demands	on	the	core	
household budget (e.g. through 
increased government services and 
higher government subsidies for such 
things as health care and childcare); 
and
•	 enhancing	the	capacity	of	families	to	
manage their resources (e.g. through 
improved budgeting skills, better 
family functioning, enhanced life 
skills, and better access to government 
and community services).
In terms of increasing household 
income, governments have two basic 
options (see OECD, 2009, 2011). The first 
focuses on paid employment. This 
Faced with mounting evidence of, and 
public concern about, family poverty, the 
government introduced a Child Hardship 
Package in the 2015 Budget. 
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involves policy measures designed to 
boost incentives for employment, raise 
overall employment levels, and enhance 
the availability of employment – 
particularly employment that is relatively 
secure and adequately paid. The second 
option is to enhance the redistributive 
effectiveness of the tax-welfare system, 
most notably by increasing the financial 
assistance available to those without paid 
employment and those with inadequate 
market incomes. In New Zealand, recent 
governments of different political 
persuasions have employed both options 
to some extent, but their efforts thus far 
have fallen well short of what is required 
to halve poverty rates, whether generally 
or for specific population groups, such as 
children.
As noted earlier, the Labour-led 
government (1999-2008) introduced the 
Working for Families package in the mid-
2000s. While this provided significant 
additional financial assistance to families 
in paid employment (especially via the in-
work tax credit which replaced the former 
child tax credit in April 2006), it provided 
no similar gains for families who are 
largely dependent on welfare benefits. As a 
result, the high poverty rates experienced 
by beneficiary families since the 1991 
welfare cuts have largely continued. 
Subsequently, in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, the National-led 
government made various policy changes 
that reduced the overall generosity of 
Working for Families and lowered public 
expenditure on family assistance. In 
particular, the abatement threshold for 
the family tax credit was reduced 
(gradually from $36,827 to $35,000), the 
abatement rate was increased (gradually 
from 20% to 25%) and the top rate of 
financial assistance available under the 
family tax credit of about $101 per week 
(which applies to the first child in a family 
aged 16–18 years) was frozen in nominal 
terms. Equally significant, the 
accommodation supplement – which is 
the largest single source of housing 
assistance to low-income families and 
individuals – was not inflation adjusted. 
Faced with mounting evidence of, and 
public concern about, family poverty, the 
government introduced a Child Hardship 
Package in the 2015 Budget. This took 
effect on 1 April 2016. The most significant 
measures included an increase in core 
benefit rates for welfare beneficiaries with 
children by up to $25 a week (the first 
increase in real terms in more than a 
generation), a modest boost to the in-
work tax credit and more generous 
childcare subsidies. While helpful, the 
changes to benefit rates were too modest 
to have a substantial impact on poverty, 
whether measured on the basis of income 
or material deprivation. Moreover, they 
constituted a one-off adjustment.
More recently, in the 2017 Budget, 
government announced a new Family 
Incomes Package. This will take effect on 1 
April 2018, assuming there is no change of 
government following the 2017 general 
election. Under the package there are at 
least three main changes that will assist 
low-income families. First, there are 
changes to several tax thresholds which 
will boost incomes (e.g. by $11 a week for 
those earning above $22,000 per annum). 
Second, there are significant changes to 
the structure and generosity of the family 
tax credit. Overall, these changes will 
provide particular benefits to families 
with young children and those with two 
or more children. Third, there are 
substantial increases in financial assistance 
via the accommodation supplement. The 
government estimates that, if fully 
implemented, the package will benefit 
approximately 310,000 families via the 
changes to the family tax credit, while the 
adjustments to the accommodation 
supplement will benefit around 136,000 
low-income households (Joyce, 2017). 
The precise impact on poverty rates is 
difficult to calculate, but it is expected that 
around 50,000 children will be lifted 
above one of the more demanding 
income-based poverty measures (i.e. 50% 
of median disposable household incomes, 
before housing costs are deducted) (ibid). 
This constitutes about a third of the 
children living in households which 
currently fall below this threshold (see 
Table 2). The impact on the proportion of 
children living in poverty as calculated on 
the basis of higher thresholds is likely to 
be significantly less.
Unfortunately, unless the package is 
amended over the next few years, its 
medium- to long-term impact on poverty 
rates will be modest. First, while the 
changes to the family tax credit will 
increase the level of financial assistance 
for most children in low-income families, 
the package also lowers the abatement 
threshold and increases the abatement 
rate, thus reducing the level of assistance 
available to families further up the income 
hierarchy. Second, and more important 
from a longer-term perspective, neither 
the family tax credit nor the in-work tax 
credit are linked to consumer prices, let 
alone average wages. Similarly, the 
accommodation supplement remains 
non-indexed. Hence, even in a period of 
relatively low price inflation, the level of 
assistance to low-income families will 
gradually erode in real terms. Third, if the 
objective is to halve poverty rates – and 
especially those for children – the 
aggregate level of governmental assistance 
(i.e. via tax credits and subsidies for 
housing, childcare and health care) 
remains too low. Indeed, the aggregate 
level of government expenditure on 
Working for Families tax credits in 2018-
19, following the introduction of the 
Family Incomes Package, will remain 
much lower in real terms than it was 
during and immediately after the global 
In the weeks leading up to the 2017 
general election, various political parties 
– including the Greens, Labour and the 
Opportunities Party – have proposed a 
range of anti-poverty initiatives.
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financial crisis (see St John in this issue of 
Policy Quarterly).
A new approach to alleviating poverty
If poverty rates in New Zealand are to be 
reduced substantially on a durable basis, a 
more comprehensive package of measures 
will be required. In the weeks leading 
up to the 2017 general election, various 
political parties – including the Greens, 
Labour and the Opportunities Party – 
have proposed a range of anti-poverty 
initiatives. These deserve careful scrutiny 
and proper public debate. 
Ideally, it would be best if a cross-party 
accord could be negotiated, with the key 
elements embodied in legislation, as 
happened in 1993 regarding New Zealand 
Superannuation. But securing such an 
agreement on an anti-poverty strategy is 
likely to be difficult. Among other things, 
there are significant differences between 
the current parliamentary parties over 
such matters as: 
•	 the	amount	of	additional	public	
expenditure that should be allocated 
to anti-poverty measures; 
•	 the	appropriate	mix	of	universal	and	
targeted forms of social assistance;
•	 the	appropriate	mix	of	cash	and	
non-cash benefits; 
•	 the	design	of	housing	policies	(see	
Grimes in this issue of Policy 
Quarterly); 
•	 the	desirability	and	effectiveness	of	
incentives for paid employment (such 
as the in-work tax credit and the use 
of sanctions within the benefit 
system) (see St John, 2006, 2013; St 
John and Dale, 2012); and 
•	 the	extent	to	which	priority	should	be	
given	to	families	with	young	children.
It is not possible to explore all the 
issues and options here, but in my view 
there remains much merit in the strategy 
recommended by the Expert Advisory 
Group on Solutions to Child Poverty in 
2012, albeit modified to take proper 
account of more recent policy initiatives 
and international agreements, such as the 
Social Development Goals. While the 
group’s 78 recommendations focused 
exclusively on child (or family) poverty, it 
would be readily possible to adapt and 
extend these recommendations to cover 
individuals and couples without children. 
In broad terms, a strategy of the kind 
proposed by the Expert Advisory Group 
would contain the following elements:
1. A clear set of medium- to long-term 
poverty-reduction targets, ideally 
embodied in legislation. Such targets 
could be based on those identified in 
the Social Development Goals but 
tailored for New Zealand’s distinctive 
social context. Such targets could be 
differentiated by age and ethnicity, 
and varied depending on whether 
they apply to income-based measures 
or material deprivation measures. 
Priority should be given to reducing 
the most severe and protracted forms 
of poverty, especially in childhood.
2. A thorough, independent review of the 
structure and level of family assistance 
and welfare benefits, perhaps similar in 
nature to the Royal Commission on 
Social Security in 1972. Part of the aim 
of such a review would be to 
investigate the costs of different kinds 
of households achieving specified 
standards of living.
3. A principled and comprehensive 
approach to the indexation of all 
forms of social assistance, including 
income support for families and 
subsidies for housing, childcare, early 
childhood education and primary 
health care.
4. For families with children, a mix of 
universal and targeted assistance (e.g. 
with an element of universal income 
support for children when they are 
very young, and a greater reliance on 
targeted assistance as they grow older, 
as parents become able to undertake 
more paid employment).
Plainly, to be effective, any anti-
poverty strategy will involve significant 
fiscal costs (see Boston and Chapple, 
2014). While there may be some scope for 
fiscal savings in certain areas of public 
policy, realistically most of these costs will 
need to be met via additional public 
expenditure. A critical political issue, 
therefore, is what priority should be given 
to reducing poverty. This, surely, ought to 
be a matter of vigorous debate during the 
2017 election campaign and beyond. It 
goes to the heart of the question of what 
kind of society we should strive to build. It 
also raises the fundamental issue of 
whether New Zealand will honour its 
international commitments and moral 
obligations.
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